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PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTOR
LIABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
AFTER ABU GHRAIB
MARK W. BINA*

I.

INTRODUCTION

During the months he was stationed in Iraq, thirty-five year-old Todd
Drobnick endured multiple violent attacks from Iraqi insurgents armed with
a variety of lethal weapons.' Tragically, Drobnick was killed on November
23, 2003 in Mosul, Iraq when the vehicle he was driving collided with a
petroleum truck.2 The Department of Defense provided him with an official
military burial and awarded him a Purple Heart and a Bronze Star.3
Months later, however, the U.S. Army revoked both of his awards. As
it turned out, Drobnick was not a member of the U.S. military; rather, he was
an employee of Titan Corp., a private military contractor providing Arabiclanguage translation services to U.S. forces in Iraq.5
Drobnick's situation is representative of the nebulous line separating
enlisted soldiers and private contractors in the current war in Iraq. But while
the vast majority of military contractors like Drobnick have served honorably
beside U.S. forces in Iraq, a handful have not.6 In fact, a small number of
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1. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Renae Merle, Line IncreasinglyBlurred Between Soldiers
and Civilian Contractors,WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at Al.
2. Ronald D. White, For Titan, Deaths Hit Close to Home, L.A. TiMES, April 19,
2004, at C 1.
3. Id.
4. Cha & Merle, supra note 1.
5. White, supra note 2. Drobnick's case was not an aberration. The Department of
Defense has mistakenly awarded military commendations to numerous private contractors.
See Medal Confusion, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 1, 2004, at A27 (noting that Titan
Corp. employees "have received more than 100 commendations for their actions during
the [Iraq] conflict"). While not eligible for a Bronze Star or a Purple Heart, military
contractors can receive the "Defense of Freedom Medal" for their service. Id.
6. See infra Section II, Part D.
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private military contractors are implicated in what has been called "arguably
the worst military scandal in a generation." 7
When a U.S. soldier engages in wrongful conduct, federal law provides8
for the criminal punishment of offenders and for compensation to victims.
Similarly, when private military contractors commit these wrongs, there are
some measures of criminal accountability. 9 Currently, however, there are no
formal procedures for compensating wartime victims injured by the wrongs
of civilian contractors. 10 Nevertheless, some victims of wrongful military
conduct are using largely untested and creative legal theories to pursue
traditional civil remedies."
This Comment uses the Abu Ghraib prison scandal 12 as a model to
analyze the complexities of criminal and civil accountability of private
military contractors and discusses the various options available to
compensate wartime victims of wrongful conduct. Part II of this comment
briefly addresses the history of military contractors, considers their
proliferation, and examines their roles in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in
Iraq. Part III analyzes whether the U.S. government can hold military
contractors criminally liable and whether private plaintiffs can hold them
civilly liable for wrongful conduct. This analysis will discuss current federal
laws, international laws, and cases relevant to the Abu Ghraib scandal.

7. P.W. Singer, The Contract the Military Needs to Break, WASH. POST, Sept. 12,
2004, at B3. See also Bruce V. Bigelow, Army Investigation Implicates Titan Contractors
in Iraq Abuse, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 26, 2004, at A16 (noting that recent Army
investigations have "implicated five unnamed civilian contractors").
8. See, e.g., Pauline Jelinek, Rumsfeld Downplays Detainee Mistreatment, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 2004, at A4 (noting that forty-five soldiers have been "referred for court
martial and [twenty-three] soldiers [have been] administratively separated from the
service"). See also, e.g., Captain Karin Tackaberry, Judge Advocates Play a Major Role
in Rebuilding Iraq: The Foreign Claims Act and Implementation of the Commander's
Emergency Response Program, 2004 ARMY LAW. 39, 40-41 (2004) (discussing the
Foreign Claims Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2000) and its application in compensating tort
claimants for injuries incurred during wartime action); Jeffrey Gettleman, For Iraqis in
Harm's Way, $5,000 and 'I'm Sorry', N.Y. TIMES, March 17, 2004, at Al (reporting that
the U.S. Army limits "sympathy payments" to civilian victims at "$1,000 per injury" and
"$2,500 per life").
9. See Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Passaro Indictment
Announcement (June 17, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/
2004/ag061704.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (announcing the criminal indictment of
C.I.A. contractor David A. Passaro for the abuse of a prisoner on a U.S. military base in
Afghanistan and charging him with two counts of "assault with a dangerous weapon" and
two counts of "assault resulting in serious bodily injury"). See also Joanne Mariner,
PrivateContractors Who Torture, CNN.COM, June 17, 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/2004/
LAW/06/17/mariner.contractors/index.html (last visited October 8, 2005) (discussing the
complexities and routes available to prosecutors seeking criminal charges against
contractors).
10. See Shannon O'Leary, Iraq Prison-Abuse Suit Targets U.S. Companies, CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, September, 2004, at 82 (discussing the challenges and uncertainties facing
Abu Ghraib torture victims who filed suit against private contractors).
11. See id. (noting the novelty and difficulty of using the federal RICO statute as a
theory of recovery).
12. See generally infra Section II, Part C.
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Lastly, Part IV proposes various legal and policy adjustments to establish
viable accountability measures over private military contractors and
considers supplementary methods of compensating victims of torture or
mistreatment.
II. U.S.
A.

MILITARY CONTRACTORS AND THEIR ROLE IN ABU GHRAIB
ContractorPrevalence in "OperationIraqiFreedom "

President Bush ordered the beginning of "Operation Iraqi Freedom" on
March 19, 2003 with a surgical air strike intended to "shock and awe"
Saddam Hussein's regime.' 3 In the aftermath of this military operation, U.S.
and coalition forces have relied on private military contractors to provide a
multitude of substantive and mission-critical services. 1 4 For example, the
United States military is almost entirely dependent on private contractors for
translation services because of a severe shortage of Arabic speaking
personnel. 15 The U.S. also employs contractors for such sensitive work as

13. Bombs Over Baghdad, THE N.Y. POST, March 22, 2003, at 26; Craig Nelson and
Larry Kaplow, U.S. Strikes at Saddam: 'Opening Stages' of War Target Iraqi Leaders,
ATLANTA J. CONST., March 20, 2003, at IA. Operation Iraqi Freedom was a pre-emptive
strike intended to "disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction" and "to liberate the Iraqi
people." Anne E. Komblut & Susan Milligan, Washington Strategy Banned Weapons;
EmphasisShifts to LiberatingIraqis,BOSTON GLOBE, April 3, 2003, at A3 1.
The Bush Administration's "War on Terror" has been the subject of legal criticism
from various perspectives. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The ChangingLaws of War: Do We
Need A New Legal Regime After September 11?, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1335, 1340-42
(2004) (criticizing the Bush Administration's legal responses to, and characterization of,
the new paradigm as a literal "War on Terror"); Jeffrey F. Addicott, Into the Star
Chamber: Does the United States Engage in the Use of Torture or Similar Illegal
Practicesin the War on Terror?, 92 KY. L.J. 849, 853 (2004) (highlighting the concerns
arising from the use of "stress and duress" interrogation styles).
14. Cha & Merle, supra note 1. Contractors used in Iraq include major construction
firms charged with helping to rebuild Iraq's crumbling roads, buildings, and other
structures. Id. Contractors now serve as "security guards" for Afghanistan President
Hamid Karzai and U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalizad. Hamida Ghafour, Afghans Are
Fed Up With Security Firm, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2004, at A3. Other contractors, like
Halliburton's subsidiary Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (KBR), are responsible for duties
ranging from "repairing tanks" to preparing meals for the troops. Cha & Merle, supra
note 1. See also Ariana Eunjung Cha, $1.9 Billion of Iraq's Money Goes to U.S.
Contractors,WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2004, at Al (describing the no-bid contract awarded to
Halliburton's KBR subsidiary to repair oil pipelines and provide other services).
Additionally, the U.S. military hired a division of contractor Northrop Grumman to
James R. Coleman, Constraining Modern
train the nascent Iraqi armed forces.
Mercenarism, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1503 (2004). The U.S. military uses numerous
other private contractor companies to secure the Baghdad's airport, instruct Iraq's
domestic police forces, and provide many other critical tasks. Id. at 1503-04.
15. See Cha & Merle, supra note 1 (reporting that reliance on private contractors for
translations became prevalent after Sept. 11, 2001 when the government realized its
personnel did not have the language skills necessary to understand or analyze Arabic
terrorist groups).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:1237

gathering and analyzing intelligence and interrogating detainees. 16
Accordingly, some have suggested that but for the assistance
from
17
contractors, Operation Iraqi Freedom simply "could not function."'
The work that some private contractors perform is often
"interchangeable" with the work done by active duty soldiers.' 8 Many
contractors wear the same camouflage uniforms worn by soldiers, except that
instead of having their name on their left breast pocket, their identification
reads "US CONTRACTOR" or "DOD [Department of Defense]
CIVILIAN."' 9 Though their work and uniforms can be identical, the
benefits soldiers and contractors receive are not.20 The work in Iraq attracts
contractors because some can command six-figure salaries, enjoy regular
paid leaves-of-absence, and live in "hotel-like accommodations.'
Not
surprisingly, because of the high pay and excellent benefits, the U.S. military
is dealing with a "brain drain" phenomenon where Special Forces 22personnel
leave the service to seek more profitable contract work as civilians.
Contractors seeking these high rewards must also accept high risks.
Since September 2004, over 100 private military contractor employees have
been killed in Iraq -a casualty statistic second only to the U.S. military and
more than all other coalition forces. 3

16. Ellen McCarthy, CACI Contract: From Supplies to Interrogation, WASH. POST,
May 17, 2004, at El (reporting that military contractor CACI International Inc. was
awarded a $500 million "blanket-purchase agreement" to assist the Army in "inventory
control," "information technology services," and "[prisoner] interrogation and intelligence
gathering").
17. Cha & Merle, supra note 1.
18. Id. (quoting Mel Goudie, the director of the Baghdad Police Academy who
supervised a team comprised of soldiers and contractors, as saying "the military role and
the civilian-contractor role are exactly the same").
19. Cha & Merle, supra note 1.
20. Id.
21. Id. (noting that "[s]oldiers earn much less, work a year or longer without a break
and must rest in sleeping bags in common areas that accommodate dozens"); but see
Jackie Spinner, For One Contractor,A Road Too Hard, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2005, at AI
(describing the financial and mental-health difficulties that one KBR contractor
experienced after expecting pay ranging from $8,000-$12,000 per month but in fact only
receiving between S2,000-$4,000 per month for driving a supply truck).
22. Michael N. Schmitt, War, International Law, and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the
Rules of the Game in a New Century: Humanitarian Law and Direct Participationin
Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 511, 515
(2005).
23. Id.
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24

The Rise of the "Corporate Warrior"

Governments around the world have used private military contractors
for many years, 25 but never before have they been used so extensively. 26 One
reason for their emergence is the post-Cold War objective of reducing
defense costs. 2 7 With fewer active duty soldiers available for deployment,
the military has increasingly relied on contractors to provide services
growing in breadth, sensitivity, and complexity.28 Indeed, critics of this
practice have cautioned that continued reliance on the use of contractors has
developed into outright dependence on their services.29
24. For additional political, economic, and policy analysis of the recent phenomenon
of private military contractors working on the front lines of U.S. military actions around
the world, see generally PETER W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS (2003); Jon D.
Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional,Democratic and Strategic Problems
With Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001 (2004); Steven L. Schooner, Contractor
Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Streamlined, Outsourced
Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 549 (2005).
25. SINGER, supra note 24, at 19. Currently, private military contractors are active
around the world, ranging from the richest industrialized nations to the poorest third-world
countries. Id. at 9. See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS:
ARMY SHOULD DO MORE TO CONTROL CONTRACT COST IN THE BALKANS 3,
GAO/NSIAD-00-225 (2000) [hereinafter G.A.O. REPORT] ("The U.S. military has relied
on contractors to provide supplies and services in support of major contingencies since the
Revolutionary War."); Major Lisa L. Turner & Major Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip
of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REv. 1, 7 (2001) ("In all countries engaged in war, experience has
sooner or later pointed out that contracts with private men of substance and understanding
are necessary for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of an Army." (quoting
Robert Morris, U.S. Superintendent of Finance in 1781)); Coleman, supra note 14, at 1496
(dating the use of contractors back to the Peloponnesian War in 413 B.C.).
26. Some contractors, such as Lockheed Martin, have integrated themselves deeply
into the fabric of U.S. governmental operations. See, e.g., Tim Weiner, Lockheed and the
Future of Warfare, N.Y. TIMES, November 28, 2004, at 3-1 (describing the numerous
services Lockheed provides and its role in the modernization of warfare). Although best
known for building warplanes and weapons systems, Lockheed also sorts mail for the U.S.
Postal Service, computes taxes for the Internal Revenue Service, prints checks for the
Social Security Administration, counts citizens for the U.S. Census Bureau, administers
space flights for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (N.A.S.A.), and
monitors the air traffic for the Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.). Id.
27. See Major Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States
Crossing the Rubicon?, 51 A.F.L. REv. 111, 111 (2001) (noting the marked contraction of
active-duty U.S. military forces from 2,174,200 to 1,385,700 in the ten-year period
between 1989 and 1999 to decrease military costs).
28. Id. at 111-12. Political scientist Peter Singer has classified private military
contractors into three major categories: supporters, consultants, and providers. SINGER,
supra note 24, at 93. Supporters provide "non-lethal aid and assistance" to the military,
with duties ranging from logistics, supply, transport of cargo, and technical support. Id. at
97. Consultants provide "advisory and training services," often on complex strategic and
tactical projects, but do not engage in work on the battlefield. Id. at 95-96. Providers are
the most controversial of all military contractors because they implement and administer a
variety of services on the battlefield by serving as "force-multipliers." Some countries
employ provider contractors to fly as combat pilots or direct "command and control of
field units." Id. at 92-94. Accordingly, providers are on the front lines of the battlefield,
often working side-by-side with military personnel in combat. Id.
29. Guillory, supra note 27, at I11.
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During the 1991 Gulf War, private military contractors accounted for
approximately 1.5 percent of the total military manpower in the Middle
East.3
In the current Iraqi conflict, there are more than 20,000 military
contractors,
accounting for approximately ten percent of the total U.S.
3
force.

1

The U.S. Department of Defense uses contractors because it "saves
money, allows the military to tap the private sector for skills it lacks and
forces it to concentrate on its core mission of protecting the country. ,,32
Others dispute that using contractors results in any cost-savings 33 and instead
focus on the dearth of legal or bureaucratic accountability measures over
modem private contractors.34 Additionally, scholars are troubled by the
"perverse incentives" contractors use to extend a mission or the war for their
own financial interests.35
With regard to accountability, it is surprising to learn that, unlike a
soldier, a commanding military officer has no legal control over a private
military contractor. 36 A military supervisor lacks even the legal authority to
order a contractor to do those services he or she was hired to perform.37
Rather, the duty of disciplining contractors falls squarely on the contractors'
corporate employer.35

30. Deborah Avant, What Are Those ContractorsDoing in Iraq?, WASH. POST, May 9,
2004, at B 1 (observing that in 1991, the military employed one private contractor in Iraq
for every sixty active-duty military personnel, whereas in 2003, the ratio jumped to
approximately one in ten).
31. Id. See also SINGER, supra note 7 (arguing that using more than 20,000 private
military contractors makes it difficult to maintain accountability).
32. Cha & Merle, supra note 1. Others have noted that using contractors frees the
President from having to formally report to, and be held accountable by, Congress when
conducting military operations. Michaels, supra note 24, at 1065-68.
33. See SINGER, supra note 24, at 157 (noting a RAND report that concluded the
privatization of military education programs yielded no net savings). Others note that the
use of contractors saves money, despite the large salaries, because the military need not
pay for training, certain benefits, and the "extensive support structure" provided for
military personnel such as "commissaries, housing, dining halls, recreational and fitness
facilities, hospitals, [and] off-duty education .. " Schmitt, supra note 22, at 517-18.
34. See SINGER, supra note 7 (noting the lack of accountability imposed on military
contractors and the confusion over the punishment of contractors under current U.S. law).
See also Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: PrivateInternational
Security Companies, InternationalLaw, and the New World Disorder,34 STAN. J. INT'L

L. 75, 77 (1998) (discussing the concern over the lack of accountability for private security
companies).
35. See Michaels, supra note 24, at 1098-99 (discussing the "Iraq Gold Mine" and
contractors' "perverse incentives" to "skew the aims of the mission"). See also Zarate,
supra note 34, at 147 (discussing African Union private security companies' close ties to
collateral industries and concerns of contractor corruption); SINGER, supra note 24, at 151
(discussing the complex principal-agent relationship of governments and military
contractors and the dilemma contractors face in serving dual masters: their contracting
principal's interest of operational success versus their corporate shareholders' interest of
"profit maximization").
36. Turner & Norton, supra note 25, at 36.
37. Id.
38. Schmitt, supra note 19, at 516.
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Accordingly, U.S. military lawyers have sounded the clarion warning
39
that contractors must not be placed in mission-critical positions. Heeding
this advice, however, may be impractical. With so much of the United
States' complex financial, political, and military infrastructure founded on
efficiency and cost-saving, it is unlikely that the use of contractors will
diminish any time soon.
Since the issues of accountability attendant to the proliferation and use
of civilian contractors transcend mere dollars and cents, the best way to
further understand the issue is to examine the events of personnel
4°
misconduct and prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.
C. Abu GhraibPrison:A Symbol of Scandal
Abu Ghraib is a vast prison compound located twenty miles outside of
Baghdad, Iraq. 4' It was the largest of seventeen prison facilities used by U.S.
forces in Iraq.4 2 Immediately after the U.S. occupation began in March
2003, Abu Ghraib was primarily used as a storehouse for common
criminals.43 As the Iraqi insurgency strengthened in the subsequent months,
the U.S. military began rounding up thousands of Iraqis and transferring
them to Abu Ghraib for interrogation. 4 As the number of Iraqi prisoners
grew, the number of military staff responsible for managing Abu Ghraib

39. Turner & Norton, supra note 25, at 41.
40. The incidents described herein were not isolated events.

See, e.g., JAMES R.
SCHLESINGER, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL To REVIEw DOD DETENTION
12 (2004) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER REPORT], available at
OPERATIONS
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d2004O824finalreport.pdf (last visited Oct. 9,
2005) (noting approximately 300 separate allegations of detainee abuse in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Cuba). Of those approximately 300 allegations, 155 were fully
investigated and yielded 66 confirmed instances of detainee abuse. Id. See also Dan

Eggen and R. Jeffrey Smith, FBI Agents Allege Abuse of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay,

POST, December 21, 2004, at Al (reporting that an FBI agent at Guantanamo Bay
witnessed detainees being subjected to abuse, including being "shackled to the floor in
fetal positions" for days at a time, deprived of food and water, and left "to defecate on
themselves").
WASH.

41. Ian Fisher, The Strugglefor Iraq: Inmate; Iraqi Recounts Hours of Abuse By U.S.

Troops, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2004, at Al. Prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saddam
Hussein used Abu Ghraib as a location to inflict torture and inhumane treatment on Iraqi
prisoners and his political enemies. See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Past Repression
and Atrocities by Saddam Hussein's Regime, April 4, 2003, available at
http://www.state.gov/s/wci/fs/19352.htm (alleging that, inter alia, Hussein executed over
4,000 prisoners at Abu Ghraib in 1984).
42. SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 40, at 11. In total, U.S. forces have imprisoned
over 50,000 people at its detention facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, and at the U.S. Naval
Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Id.
43. Id. Ultimately, Abu Ghraib held a variety of detainees, including "Iraqi and
foreign terrorists as well as a mix of Enemy Prisoners of War, other security detainees,
criminals and undoubtedly some accused as a result of factional rivalries." Id.
44. Id. at 10-11.
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stagnated.45 In October 2003, a total of ninety military and contractor
personnel were responsible for over 7,000 prisoners in Abu Ghraib.46
1.

Contractorsat Abu Ghraib
In addition to the military personnel stationed at Abu Ghraib, the U.S.
Army employed a number of private contractors to augment its interrogation
and intelligence workforce.47
The Army hired employees of CACI
International Inc.45 ("CACI") to interrogate prisoners and analyze military
intelligence, and hired employees of Titan Corp. ("Titan") 49 to provide

45. Id. at 10-11, 28-29. See also Scott Higham et al., A Prison on the Brink; Usual
Military Checks and Balances Went Missing, WASH. POST, May 9, 2004, at Al (reporting
that during the abuse, there was one battalion of soldiers guarding approximately 7,000
prisoners, whereas "Army doctrine calls for one battalion per 4,000 enemy soldiers"). The
conditions at Abu Ghraib in October, 2003 have been described as "seriously
overcrowded, under-resourced, and under continual attack." SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra
note 40, at 11.
46. Higham et al., supra note 45. See also Jonathan Eig, Inside Abu Ghraib: Missed
Red Flags, Team Under Stress, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2004, at Al (chronicling the
difficult work conditions at Abu Ghraib, the background of the alleged ringleader, Cpl.
Charles Graner, and examples of abuse).
47. See Cha & Merle, supra note I (noting that four CACI interrogators and numerous
Titan translators worked at Abu Ghraib).
48. CACI International, Inc. is headquartered in Arlington, Va., and specializes in
information technology deployment and "systems integration" solutions. CACI employs
approximately 9,500 people in more than 100 offices in the United States and Europe,
and had revenues of $1.62 billion in 2005.
CACI Int'l Inc., CACI's Profile,
http://www.caci.com/about/profile.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
Some critics pointed out that the U.S. military awarded CACI's Abu Ghraib contract
in secret and that the contract involves a startling expansion of duties falling outside of the
scope of CACI's original contract. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 16 (reporting that the
U.S. Department of the Interior admisters CACI's contract for interrogation services at
Abu Ghraib and that the contract was originally intended to provide only "routine
services" for the Army, such as "inventory control"). A congressional investigation of
CACI's contracts conducted by the General Accounting Office found major flaws in
"monitoring performance or controlling costs" and confirmed that CACI's
employees
"performed jobs that went far beyond the initial contract terms." Griff Witte, Contractors
Were Poorly Monitored, GAO Says; Report Contends CA CI PerformedJobs in IraqMeant
for Government, WASH. POST, April 30, 2005, at El.
Approximately eight months after the Abu Ghraib abuse first became known, the U.S.
Army awarded CACI a new six-month, $23 million contract to continue providing
"interrogation services" in Iraq. Ellen McCarthy, Changes Behind the Barbed Wire,
WASH. POST, December 13, 2004, at El. Recently, however, CACI announced its plans to
discontinue providing interrogation services to the Army once its contract expires. Ellen
McCarthy, CACI Plans to DropInterrogation Work, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2005, at D4.
49. Titan Corp. was recently purchased by L-3 Communications, a major defense
contractor, for $2.65 billion. Dave Liedtka, L-3 Communications Agrees to Acquire Titan
for $2.65 Billion, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 3, 2005. The new L-3 subsidiary, L-3
Communications Titan, is headquartered in San Diego, Ca., and provides "comprehensive
information and communications products, solutions, and services for National Security
and the Security of our Homeland."
Titan Corp., About The Titan Corporation,
http://www.titan.com/about (last visited Oct. 9, 2005). L-3 Communications Titan
employs approximately 12,500 people and has yearly sales approaching $2.5 billion. Id.
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5°
translation services for all segments of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Alarmingly, many Titan translators are "artists, grocery baggers, recent
college graduates and others with no background in translating.... ,51
Equally troubling is the fact that prior to working in Iraq, more than a third
of these contractors "did not receive formal training in military interrogation
techniques, policy, or doctrine., '52 Those translators that did receive training
attended a one-week program at Fort Benning, Georgia to learn basic
military protocol, self-defense, and the human-rights requirements of the
Geneva Conventions.53

Abu Ghraib Torture and the Aftermath

2.

Throughout the fall and early winter of 2003, several prisoners at Abu
54
torture. 5 5
Ghraib endured a variety of heinous mental, physical, and sexual
The acts included repeated beatings, sexual humiliation, rape, sodomy, and
56
Army investigators
an array of food, sleep, and sensory deprivations.
50. Cha & Merle, supra note 1.
51. Id.

52. SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 40, at 69.
53. Cha & Merle, supra note 1.
54. See MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF
THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 50 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT]
(concluding that numerous U.S. military personnel "have committed egregious acts and
grave breaches of international law at Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, Iraq"). The Taguba
Report also implicates CACI and Titan employees for participating in the abuse. Id. at 48.
55. Torture is universally prohibited by both custom and law. See Winston P. Nagen
and Lucie Atkins, The International Law of Torture: From Universal Proscription to
Effective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 91-92 (2001)

(analyzing the universal prohibition on torture and discussing torture's role in international
law).

See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 102 (1987) (outlining the legal prohibition on torture). In keeping with these
standards, the United States has outlawed torture in various forms. Treaty/International
Law: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). This document is considered the "foundation"
for other international laws pertaining to torture. Addicott, supra note 13 at 858.
56. TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 54, at 15-20. Taguba's investigation and findings
used sworn statements of witnesses, including soldiers, private contractors from Titan and
CACI, and Abu Ghraib prisoners. Id. at 18-19. A sampling of the abuses noted in the
report include pouring phosphoric liquid from broken chemical lights on detainees,
threatening detainees with a loaded gun, beating detainees with a chair and a broom
handle, threatening the detainees with rape, pouring cold water on detainees, and
sodomizing a detainee with various objects. Id. at 17.
The Taguba Report also detailed the following conduct against detainees: punching,
slapping, and kicking; jumping on appendages; taking videos and photographs of detainees
in the nude; placing naked detainees in sexually explicit positions; keeping detainees nude
for several consecutive days; forcing male detainees to masturbate while being videotaped
and photographed; placing hoods and sandbags on detainees heads; attaching wires to a
detainee's "fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture"; engaging in sexual
intercourse between a male soldier and a female detainee; and scores of additional sexual,
mental, and physical abuse. Id. at 16-17. See also U.S. Army Criminal Investigation
Division, Investigation and Depositions Relating to Abu Ghraib Abuses 6, (2004),

available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/AbuGhraib/Abull .pdf (last visited Oct.
9, 2005) (compiling from depositions and sworn statements by witnesses a host of
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concluded that the parties responsible for these acts were U.S. soldiers,
military police, military intelligence personnel, and private contractors that
Titan and CACI employed.57
On January 13, 2004, Specialist Joseph Darby, a soldier stationed at
Abu Ghraib who witnessed some of the abuse, provided Army investigators
with some disturbing information. 58 He gave the investigators a compact
disc that contained digital photographs depicting various forms of abuse.5 9
But for the courageous actions of Specialist Darby, the atrocities of Abu
Ghraib may never have been discovered. 60 Days later, Lieutenant General
Ricardo Sanchez ordered an investigation into the abuses. 61 By April, the
story and a handful of pictures of the Abu Ghraib abuses were publicized
around the world.62 The U.S. government has not released all the
videographic and photographic evidence of the abuse due to the ongoing
63
investigation.

extremely graphic abuses that a group of ten soldiers and private military contractors
committed); Neil A. Lewis and David Johnston, FBI Memos Detail Abuse of Detainees,
CHI. TRIB., December 21, 2004, § 1, at 13 (reporting that FBI agents witnessed detainee

abuse that included "strangulation, beatings, placement of lit cigarettes into the detainees'
ear openings and unauthorized interrogations" and ultimately circulated "Urgent Report"
memos to a variety of U.S. officials detailing the abuse).
57. TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 54, at 44-48.
58. SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 40, at 39.

59. Id.
60. Id. Indeed, U.S. Army and FBI memos later indicated that U.S. Special Forces
personnel threatened Defense Intelligence Agency witnesses of the abuse to not report the
mistreatment. Neil A. Lewis, Memos Say 2 Officials Who Saw Prison Abuse Were
Threatened, N.Y. TIMES, December 7, 2004 at A19. One memo indicated that some
detainees had "bum marks on their backs," bruises, and "some complained of kidney
pain." Id.
61. TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 54, at 6.
62. Seymour M. Hersh, Torture At Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040510fafact (last visited Oct. 9,
2005). See also, e.g., Seymour M. Hersh, Chain of Command, THE NEW YORKER, May
17, 2004, available at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?040517fafact2
(last
visited Oct. 9, 2005) (describing how the images of abuse were first published by the CBS
program "60 Minutes II" on April 28, 2004); The Memory Hole, Photos of Iraqis Being
Abused by U.S. Personnel, http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/iraqis tortured/index2.htm
(last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (displaying one set of twenty-eight photographs of abuse and
torture at Abu Ghraib prison).
63. At a U.S. Senate hearing on the subject of the Abu Ghraib abuses, Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld warned Senators that Army investigators had additional
videos and pictures of "sadistic, cruel and inhuman" treatment of prisoners, and that "[it's
going to get still more terrible, I'm afraid." Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, Rumsfeld
Accepts Blame and Offers Apology in Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004, at Al. After
viewing the evidence in question, Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) told reporters, "We're
not just talking about giving people a humiliating experience - we're talking about rape
and murder andsome very serious charges." Id. (emphasis added).
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D. Investigating "The Worst Military Scandal in a Generation ,4
Th6 Department of Defense panel in charge of investigating the Abu
Ghraib torture interviewed over 170 witnesses and reviewed over 9,000
documents. 65 In total, their investigation found that twenty-three military
intelligence personnel and four private contractors were directly responsible
66
for the torture and abuse at Abu Ghraib prison. Additionally, eight military
intelligence personnel and two private 67contractors were identified as
witnessing, yet failing to report, the abuses.
In all, there were forty-four confirmed incidents of abuse at Abu Ghraib
prison. 68 Army investigators allege employees of Titan and CACI were
69
involved in no fewer than sixteen of the incidents. The panel investigating
the abuses found that "a preponderance of evidence supports" findings that a
number of CACI and Titan employees actively engaged in the abuse or failed
to report abuses. 70 As a result, the investigators recommended referring
many. of the implicated contractors and soldiers to the U.S. Department of
7
Justice for potential criminal prosecution. ' Despite these horrible abuses,

64. SINGER, supra note 7.
65. General Paul Kern et al., Special Defense Department Briefing on Results of
Investigation of Military Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib Prison Facility, (2004)
[hereinafter DOD Briefing] available at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/
2004/tr20040825-1224.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2005); U.S. Department of Defense,
Accompanying Slides to Special Defense Department Briefing on Results of Investigation
of Military Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib Prison Facility, (2005) [hereinafter DOD
4
Accompanying Slides], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug200 /
d2004O826slides.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).
Since the initial investigation began, the Department of Defense has opened eight
separate inquiries that have interviewed over 950 witnesses and reviewed over 15,000
documents. Jess Bravin, Ghraib Ex-Inmates Seek Investigation of US. Officials, WALL
ST. J., November 30, 2004, at A6.
66. DOD Accompanying Slides, supra note 65.
67. Id.
68. SINGER, supra note 7.
69. Id.
70. Master General George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib
Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade 130-34, August, 23, 2004
[hereinafter Fay Report], available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/noUshared/bsp/hi/pdfs/

26_08_04_fayreport.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
Examples of contractors' abuse and insubordinate activity at Abu Ghraib run the
gamut from simple insubordination to egregious violations of military and international
law. The first CACI employee identified is implicated in battering a detainee, consuming
alcohol while on duty, and being insubordinate to a commanding military officer who
questioned his interrogation techniques. Id. The second CACI interrogator identified in
the Fay Report used a dog to threaten a detainee with physical harm, engaged in various
physical abuses, and failed to report or prevent other personnel from abusing prisoners. Id.
The third contractor implicated, a Titan employee, witnessed, but failed to report, prisoner
abuse and partook in translating many of the verbal threats against detainees. Id. Another
Titan employee was found to be an active participant in the abuse. Id. This contractor
photographed naked detainees, beat a detainee with such force as to require stitches, and
allegedly raped a young male detainee. Id. The remaining contractor implicated in the
Fay Report engaged in similar abusive behavior. Id.
71.

Id.
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intelligence officers estimate that approximately eighty-five percent of Abu
Ghraib detainees "were of no intelligence value.... 72 Indeed, some of this
torture was done purely for sadistic pleasure.73
Thus far, the U.S. soldiers implicated in the Abu Ghraib scandal have
faced a variety of criminal punishments.7 4 Yet, unlike their military coworkers, the employees of Titan and CACI have not yet been charged with
any crimes. 75 However, both Titan and CACI are facing civil lawsuits for
their alleged roles in the Abu Ghraib scandal.76

72. See id. (citing the estimate of Sergeant Jose Garcia, an Abu Ghraib Detainee
Assessment Board member, that between 85%-90% of Abu Ghraib detainees "were of no
intelligence value").
73. See James Schlesinger, The Truth About Our Soldiers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2004,
at A16 ("We did it for the fun of it." (quoting a soldier involved in the abuse)). Although
some soldiers did it for fun, others thought it was just business as usual. See Peter Slevin,
U.S. Pledges Not to Torture Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, June 27, 2004, at Al ("If you
don't violate someone's human rights some of the time, you probably aren't doing your
job." (quoting a supervisor of military interrogators)).
The attorney for Charles Graner, a soldier charged with, inter alia, orchestrating the
placement and photography of nude prisoners in a human pyramid, contends his client's
actions were "no big deal" because "[c]heerleaders all across America form pyramids
every day, and it doesn't hurt people.... I think everything that was done [in Abu Ghraib]
was perfectly lawful." Eig, supra note 46 at A16. At Graner's court-martial trial,
Graner's attorney argued that he was ordered to "soften up" the detainees and that the
resulting abuse was ultimately intended to secure Iraq's freedom. See Kate Zernike, Jury
Takes Five Hours to Reach Verdict in Abu Ghraib Case, N.Y. TIMES, January 15, 2005, at
Al (reporting on Graner's convictions and quoting Graner's attorney that "[s]ometimes,
when you make an omelet, you have to break some eggs..."). Ultimately, Graner was
sentenced to ten years in prison, received a reduction in rank, and will receive a
dishonorable discharge upon his release. Graner Gets 10 Years for Abu Ghraib Abuse,

MSNBC.coM, January 15, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6795956.
74. See, e.g., 130 GIs Have Been Citedfor POW Abuse, CHI. TRIn., December 16,
2004, at A17 (reporting that 130 troops have been charged or punished in abuse cases in
Iraq, Afghanistan, or Guantanamo Bay). See also Eig, supra note 46, at A16 (noting six
soldiers' punishments, ranging from suspension and reprimands to jail time, and that four
soldiers are still awaiting trial); Alex Rodriguez, GI Pleads Guilty in PrisonAbuse, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 21, 2004, at Al (reporting that Staff Sergeant Ivan Frederick was sentenced to
eight years in prison after pleading guilty to charges including forcing a prisoner to stand
on a box and "wrap[ing] wires on his fingers and toes to make him think he was about to
be electrocuted"). But see Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Will Not Try 17 G.1 's Implicated in

Prisoners'Deaths,N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 2005, at Al (noting that none of the seventeen
U.S. soldiers identified by Army investigators as having a role in the deaths of three
detainees would face prosecution).
75. Mariner, supra note 9.

76. See Marty Logan, Victims' Lawyers Say Abu Ghraib Reports Help Their Case,

INTER PRESS SERVICE (MONTREAL), August 31, 2004 (noting multiple lawsuits filed
against Titan and CACI).
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1II. ANALYSIS: CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY OF
MILITARY CONTRACTORS

When military personnel commit crimes, they are prosecuted under the
77
But when it comes to private
Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ").

military contractors, the filing of criminal charges is a relatively rare and
protracted occasion.78 Likewise, because U.S. law precludes plaintiffs from
9
holding military personnel civilly liable, the manner in which plaintiffs can
sue private military contractors remains uncertain. This section will discuss
the options available to prosecutors and torture victims seeking to hold
private military contractors accountable for wrongful conduct.
A.
1.

CriminalLiabilityfor Military Contractors

EstablishingJurisdiction:The Military ExtraterritorialJurisdictionAct

Until recently, private military contractors enjoyed a loophole in
federal law that shielded them from criminal liability for their actions
occurring overseas.80 Contractors that violated U.S. law abroad could
essentially avoid court-martial jurisdiction and most criminal jurisdictions in
U.S. federal courts. ts

77. See 10 U.S.C. § 805 (2000) (applying military jurisdiction around the world and
subjecting U.S. military personnel to UCMJ jurisdiction). See also 10 U.S.C. 802(a)(10)
(subjecting certain civilians who serve "with or accompany[] an armed force in the field"
or during a war to UCMJ jurisdiction). This section, however, does not apply to civilians,

like contractors, that "have no status in peacetime."

ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE

CITY OF NEW YORK COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE ON
MILITARY AFFAIRS AND JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE
UNITED STATES' INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES 33 [hereinafter ABCNY COMMITTEE]

available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/HUMANRIGHTS.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
Thus, the UCMJ does not provide jurisdiction over private military contractors. See also
Robb v. United States, 456 F.2d 768) (holding that the UCMJ does not apply to a civilian
engineer working for the Navy in Vietnam).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Passaro, Indictment, No. 5:04-CR-211-1 (E.D.N.C.
6
2004), available at http://news.fmdlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/uspassaro 1704ind2.html
year after he
one
than
more
Passaro
David
contractor
(last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (indicting
beat a detainee with his hands, feet, and a large flashlight during a C.I.A. interrogation that
took place in Afghanistan on June 19 and 20, 2003). As a result of the beatings, the
detainee died in his cell the next day. Id. Jurisdiction was established under the "special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States" as provided by 18 U.S.C.
§ 7(9)(a) because the alleged beatings occurred on a U.S. Army Base in Afghanistan. Id.
See also Mariner, supra note 9 (noting that criminal charges have not been filed against
contractors implicated in Abu Ghraib abuse).
79. See CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
5 (1973) (discussing the history and concept of sovereign immunity as later applied by the
United States in connection with Blackstone's maxim that "the king can do no wrong").
See also The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 26800) (2000) (listing members of the
U.S. military as exempt from liability).
80. Major Joseph R. Perlak, The Military ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Act of 2000:
Implicationsfor ContractorPersonnel,169 MIL. L. REV. 92, 93 (2001).

81. Id.
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Congress closed this loophole in 2000 with the passage of the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA).82 Under the MEJA, many U.S.
criminal laws extend to certain locations, such as military bases in other
countries.
The MEJA also broadens these laws to include civilian and
contractor personnel accompanying U.S. forces abroad.84
One uncertainty for the U.S. Department of Justice in using the MEJA
against a military contractor is that such a prosecution is literally
unprecedented.85 Congress passed the MEJA with the understanding that the
U.S. Department of Defense would provide guidance on how it should apply
to private contractors.86 Nearly five years after the MEJA's passage, the
U.S. Department of Defense has yet to complete this task. Moreover, the
MEJA applies only to U.S. military installations overseas. It does not apply
to locations occupied by U.S. forces, such as Abu Ghraib prison.88
Therefore, while federal prosecutors and courts ostensibly have the
power to establish criminal jurisdiction over private military contractors who
work on military installations in Iraq, it is unclear exactly how such a case
might proceed. Assuming a case filed under the MEJA has proper
jurisdiction, the next consideration is the choice of federal law to prosecute
military contractors charged with detainee abuse.
2. FederalCriminalLaws Relating to Torture
The War Crimes Act - 18 U.S.C. § 2441
The first option available to prosecute private military contractors is the
War Crimes Act of 1996 (WCA). 89 This statute criminally penalizes any
U.S. soldier or U.S. national for committing a war crime, regardless of where
the crime was committed. 90 A defendant found guilty under the WCA faces
punishment that could include fines, prison, or the death penalty. 91
a.

82. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000). Despite implementation of the MEJA and its
subsequent amendments, some have argued that other loopholes still exist. See Frederick
A. Stein, Have We Closed the Barn Door Yet? A Look at the Current Loopholes in the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 27 Hous. J. INT'L L. 579, 606 (2005)
(identifying at least five major MEJA loopholes and calling for additional amendments).
83. Major Tyler J. Harder, Recent Developments in Jurisdiction: Is This the Dawn of
the Year of Jurisdiction?, 2001 ARMY LAW. 2, 12 (2001) (detailing the MEJA's
implementation and coverage).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3261.
85. Kathleen Cahill, Outside Contractors,Outside MilitaryLaw, WASH. POST, May 9,
2004, at B5.
86. Id. Section 3266(a) of the MEJA provides that the Secretary of Defense "shall
prescribe regulations governing the apprehension, detention, delivery, and removal of
persons under this chapter ..
87. Cahill, supra note 85.
88. SINGER, supra note 24, at 240.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a).
91. Id.
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The WCA defines a "war crime" as any "grave breach" of the Geneva
party. 92
Conventions or any other treaty to which the United States is a
Implemented in 1949, the Geneva Conventions outlaw, inter alia, torture and
inhumane treatment. 93 Furthermore, Common Article 3 of the Geneva
personal dignity," such as
Conventions prohibits "outrages upon
94
"humiliating and degrading treatment."
The U.S. Army investigation of the Abu Ghraib abuses has already
95
concluded that those responsible for the torture have met this threshold.
Therefore, absent any jurisdictional difficulties, there should be no
substantive legal obstacles to the criminal prosecution of a military
contractor found to be responsible for detainee torture.
b.

The Torture Statute - 18 U.S.C. § 2340

The second option available to federal prosecutors, 18 U.S.C. § 2340
("Torture Statute"), is a relatively new law. 96 The Torture Statute makes it a
crime for any U.S. national to commit, or attempt to commit, torture.97 For a
defendant to be criminally liable, the torture itself must be committed
"outside the United States." 98 If found guilty under the Torture Statute, a
defendant faces punishment commensurate with the level of abuse, ranging
from fines, prison, and death. 99
Under this statute, "torture" is defined as an act "specifically intended
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering... upon another person
within his custody or physical control... ."'00 The employees of Titan and

92. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c).
93. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 308 [hereinafter Geneva
Conventions]. For a brief discussion of the Geneva Conventions and a critical analysis of
the Bush administration's post-September 11 legal response, see Paust, supra note 13. For
a more expansive discussion of the Geneva Conventions with regard to military
contractors, see Schmitt, supra note 22, at 519.
94. Geneva Conventions art. 3(1)(c), supra note 93, 6 U.S.T. at 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at
290.
95. TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 54, at 50 (concluding that numerous U.S. soldiers
have committed "grave breaches of international law at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp
Bucca, Iraq").
96. The Torture Statute became effective on April 30, 1994. P.L. 103-236, Title V,
Part A, § 506(a), 108 Stat. 463 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000)).
Section 2340 was enacted to satisfy the requirements of the U.N. Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 46,
U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984) (reprinted in 23
I.L.M. 1027 (Feb. 4, 1985)) [hereinafter CAT]. See S. REP. No. 107-44, at 4 (2002)
(recognizing that section 2340 applies to CAT and to the Torture Victim Protection Act).
See also Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
InternationalLaw: U.S. Abuse of IraqiDetainees at Abu Ghraib Prison, 98 AM. J. INT'L.

L. 591, 592 (2004) (discussing the CAT and the United States' duties thereunder).
97. The Torture Statute P.L. 103-236, 108 Stat. 463.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A.
99. Id.

100. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). Congress further defined "severe mental pain or suffering"
as "the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from.., the intentional infliction or
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CACI found to be involved in the Abu Ghraib abuse would face criminal
liability under even the narrowest reading of this statute.
Although many potential targets have emerged in the ten years since
this law was codified, the Department of Justice has yet to prosecute anyone
under the Torture Statute. 10 1 Consequently, human rights advocates have
suggested that this failure to prosecute is tantamount to the United States
being a "safe haven" for torturers. 10 2 Perhaps more alarming to critics is the
Department of Justice General Counsel's determination that the Torture
Statute is constitutionally inapplicable to all interrogations ordered by
President Bush.'1 3 In 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded that
torture occurs only where the physical pain endured is the type that
accompanies "death or organ failure.' ' 4

threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering.., or the threat of imminent
death ..... Id.
101. See WILLIAM J. ACEVES, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A SAFE HAVEN FOR
TORTURERS
50-54 (2002), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/stoptorture/
safehaven.pdf, (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (noting the U.S. Department of Justice's failure
to prosecute under § 2340).
102. Id.
103. UNITED STATES, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS
IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL,
POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 21 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc8.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2005)
(concluding that applying the strictures of section 2340A to interrogations of suspected
terrorists in Iraq may be an unconstitutional abridgement of the President's powers). This
memorandum couches its reasoning in the President's inherent powers as Commander-inChief: "In order to respect the President's inherent constitutional authority to manage a
military campaign, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A... must be construed as inapplicable to
interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority." Id. at 21.
104. See Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Regarding the Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 46 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter D.O.J. Bybee Memo],
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogation
memo20020801.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2005) (concluding that torture under sections
2340-2340A involves only "extreme acts" that "must be of an intensity akin to that which
accompanies serious physical injury such as death or organ failure" and noting that some
acts that may be "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment" do not constitute torture).
The Bush Administration "disavowed" Bybee's memorandum in June 2004, and the
Department of Justice worked for seven months to revise its contents to provide the
Department of Defense and CIA with updated legal guidance pertaining to the use of
torture in detainee interrogations. Jess Bravin, InterrogationPolicy Proves Elusive, WALL
ST. J., December 13, 2004, at A4. The latest revision of this memorandum backed down
from the controversial definition of torture and retreated from its prior contention that
authorizing torture is within the purview of presidential power. Memorandum from Daniel
Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General to James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General,
regarding Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2005). See also Jess Bravin,
U.S. Revamps Policy on Torture Of War Prisoners, WALL ST. J., December 31, 2004, at
Al (reporting on the latest revision and the internal administration struggles to define
torture). The latest memo, however, continues to assert that the interrogation methods
previously authorized by the Department of Justice are legally acceptable. Id.
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It remains to be seen how federal prosecutors and courts will apply and
interpret the Torture Statute.
Moreover, it is unclear whether this
interpretation extends to private military contractors.
Because Congress drafted the Torture Statute to provide only a criminal
cause of action,' 0 5 a victim of torture must look elsewhere to find a legal
right to bring a civil cause of action.
B. Civil Liabilityfor Private Contractors
In addition to holding private military contractors criminally
accountable, another concern is how the victims of torture, war crimes, or
other wrongs are compensated for their injuries. This section explores the
various methods available to plaintiffs seeking damages against private
military contractors.
1.

The Alien Tort Claims Act

The first and oldest law a torture victim can sue under is the Alien Tort
Claims Act (ATCA).10 6 First adopted in 1789,107 the ATCA provides that
federal district courts have "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."'' 0 8 The ATCA was rarely used during the first 191
years of its existence.' 0 9 Then, in 1980, the Second Circuit breathed new life
into the ATCA when it decided the landmark international human rights
10
case, Filartigav. Pefia-Irala."
1
In Filartiga,the plaintiff, Dr. Filartiga, sued Pefia-Irala, a Paraguayan
national, for torturing and killing Dr. Filartiga's seventeen year-old son in
1976."' The court held that personal jurisdiction was established when
Filartiga served process on Pefia-Irala, who was within the territorial borders
of the United States at the time of service." 12 However, the court noted that

105. 18 U.S.C. § 2340B.

106. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). For an excellent discussion of the ATCA's role in the
laws of nations, and in particular its application to U.S. case law, see Genc Trnavci, The
Meaning and Scope of the Law of Nations in the Context of the Alien Tort Claims Act and
InternationalLaw, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 193 (2005).
107. John Haberstroh, The Alien Tort Claims Act & Doe v. Unocal: A PaqueteHabana
Approach to the Rescue, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 231, 236 (2004).

108. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
109. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims:
Inquiries into the Alien Tort Claims Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4-5 n.15

(1985) (noting the ATCA had been used only twenty-one times from its inception in 1789
until 1980). One reason for the ATCA's infrequent use could be scholars' and courts'
struggles to interpret its few cases, mysterious origins, and complete lack of legislative
history. Eric Engle, The Torture Victim's Protection Act, The Alien Tort Claims Act, and
Foucault's Archaeology of Knowledge, 67 ALB. L. REV. 501, 502 (noting the ATCA's

origins and its dormancy until 1980). Judge Friendly once remarked that "although [the
ATCA] has been with us since the first Judiciary Act... no one seems to know whence it
came." Haberstroh, supra note 107, 236 n.30.
110. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
111. Id. at 878. The torture and murder occurred in Paraguay. Id.
112. Id. at 879.
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jurisdiction under the ATCA is proper only if the '1alleged
torture violates a
13
specific treaty or the more general "law of nations."
The Filartiga court found that "an act of torture committed by a state
official against one held in detention violates established norms of the
'
international law of human rights, and hence the law of nations. 114
Consequently, torture victims from around the world have successfully sued
under the ATCA for compensation for their injuries.115
When Filartiga opened the door to new litigation, it also ignited a
debate over the nature of the ATCA's contemporary usage.1 16 Specifically,
the debate turned on whether the ATCA was strictly a jurisdictional statute
or whether it imparts an independent cause of action for violations of
international law-based norms.1 17 Fortunately, the
Supreme Court recently
118
handed down a definitive answer to this question.
2.

The A TCA, Sosa, and InternationalLegal Norms

The Supreme Court recently clarified the mysteries of the ATCA with
its decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.119 In Sosa, both parties were
Mexican nationals. 120 The plaintiff, Alvarez-Machain, sued Sosa under the
ATCA and Federal Tort Claims Act 12 1 for injuries he received after Sosa

113.

Id. at 880.

114. Id. at 880.

In coming to this conclusion, the court relied upon a litany of

international law instruments, Supreme Court law, and related authority. Id. at 880-86.
115. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
"universally accepted norms of international law" prohibit torture and that the TVPA
extends that prohibition to summary execution); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.Supp. 162, 170
(D. Mass. 1995) (holding that subjecting prisoners to fourteen hour-long interrogations
constituted torture); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F.Supp.2d 401, 420-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(finding that the beating of a detainee with hands constitutes torture); Cabiri v. AssasieGyimah, 921 F.Supp. 1189, 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying defendant's motion to
dismiss plaintiffs complaint of torture involving beatings and electric shocks to the
genitals); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (lth Cir. 1996) (holding that
threatening a detainee with death constitutes torture).
116. See Gregory G. Garre, Coded Message; Lower Courts Must Decipher Supreme
Court Ruling on Resurrected Alien Tort Statute, LEGAL TIMES, September 6, 2004, at 52
(discussing the legal debate over the ATCA's jurisdictional nature prior to Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004)).
117. Id.
118. Id. In Sosa, the Court ruled that the ATCA was merely jurisdictional in nature and
did not create a statutory cause of action. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761.
119. 124 S. Ct. 2739. For an exhaustive and well-researched analysis of Sosa, see
Ashley Wright Baker, Forcible Transborder Abduction: Defensive Versus Offensive
Remedies for Alvarez-Machain, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1373 (2004). See also Benjamin
Berkowitz, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: United States Courts as Forums for Human Rights
Cases and the New Incorporation Debate, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 289 (2005)
(discussing the "new incorporation debate" with respect to Sosa and comparing it to the
incorporation battles of applying the Bill of Rights to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
120. 124 S.Ct. at 2746.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000). The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") provides that
the United States cannot be held civilly liable for claims that arise in foreign countries. Id.
See also William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of
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abducted him and delivered him into the custody of the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration in Texas.122 At issue was whether AlvarezMachain's illegal seizure and detainment constituted a "violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States. ' 23 The Court held that the facts
24
did not rise to such a
of Alvarez-Machain's seizure and brief detainment
25
decision.1
court's
appellate
the
level, and reversed
In its reasoning, the Court unanimously concluded that the ATCA did
not create any new cause of action and that, at its core, it is nothing more
than a jurisdictional statute. 126 Then, by a 6-3 majority, the Court went one
step further, recognizing that "residual common law discretion" exists under
the ATCA. 127 This discretion permits federal courts to consider and
adjudicate violations of the law of nations in all cases filed under the
ATCA.128 The Court noted, however, that such violations of international29
law must be universally condemned and prohibited by criminal law.1
Torture is one crime that meets this standard. 130 Accordingly, for the victims
of torture at Abu Ghraib, current and forthcoming suits against private
contractors involved in the abuse should not face any jurisdictional barriers
under the ATCA.
Recent cases decided after Sosa have reiterated these standards. For
example, in Jama v. Esmor, the plaintiffs were immigrants detained in the
3
'
United States who were allegedly abused by a private prison contractor.1
The trial court refused to grant summary judgment to the defendant
corporation that had contracted with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization

Government and Its Employees for Torts and ConstitutionalTorts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U.
1105, 1123 (1996) (providing an overview of the FTCA and the foreign country

exception's confusing applications).
122. See Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2746 (describing how the U.S. Drug Enforcement

Administration hired "Mexican nationals to seize Alvarez and bring him to the United
States for trial" and how Sosa was involved with abducting Alvarez from his home,

holding Alvarez in a motel overnight, and ultimately bringing him by a chartered plane to
El Paso, Texas where federal agents arrested Alvarez).
123. Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2747 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350). The second issue the Court
considered was the scope of the FTCA. Id. The Court held that Alvarez could not recover
under the FTCA. Id.
124. The majority characterized Alvarez's injuries as "a single illegal detention of less
than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt

arraignment .... Id. at 2769. With no evidence of torture or other abuse, the Court found
no violation of international law. Id.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 2761, 2764.
Id. at 2769.
Garre, supra note 116.
Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2766 ("Actionable violations of international law must be of a

norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory." (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994))).
130. Id. at 2765-66 ("For purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become - like the
pirate and slave trader before him - hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."
(quoting Filartiga,630 F.2d at 890)).
131. Jama v. U.S. I.N.S., No. 97-3093, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22697, *51-52 (Dist.
N.J. 2004).
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Service ("INS") to provide prison services for INS detainees. 32 Relying on
Sosa, the trial court found that, in view of the internationally recognized
prohibition on the contractor's alleged conduct, the plaintiffs evidence
of
133
abuse raised a sufficient question of material fact to proceed to trial.
As Jama demonstrates, the ATCA will be central to any civil suit filed
by foreign nationals against persons and entities responsible for torture.
34
However, it is not the only statute under which plaintiffs may recover.'
3.

The Torture Victims ProtectionAct

The Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA) provides a civil remedy to
U.S. victims of torture or "extrajudicial killing" against any individual
perpetrator who was acting "under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation."' 3 5 Congress created the TVPA to carry out the
requirements of the U.N. Charter and other related human rights
agreements. 136 When used in conjunction with the ATCA, however, the
TVPA also provides non-citizens with a substantive cause of action for
injuries resulting from their torture. 137 Several cases following Sosa have
reaffirmed this proposition and noted that such actions 3 may proceed
regardless of the proximity of a U.S. connection to the torture. 8
The TVPA defines torture as an act in which "severe pain or
suffering.., whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on [an]
individual for such purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third
person information or a confession.. . ...139 The TVPA also requires
plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative remedies 40 before filing suit and
creates a ten-year statute of limitations from the time the cause of action
132. The abuses alleged by the plaintiff detainees were remarkably similar to the abuses
at Abu Ghraib. The court noted that "[d]etainees were beaten, confined without cause to
solitary confinement and sexually abused and humiliated on repeated occasions." Id. at
*28. The plaintiffs also allege they were subjected to filthy living conditions, harsh
temperatures, sleep deprivation, and an array of similar physical and mental abuses. Id. at
*26-27.
133. Id. at *51-52.
134. See generally Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The
Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DEPAuL L. REV. 433 (2002) (explaining the
various methods of recovery available to individuals in international human rights
litigation).
135. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1991)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2000)).
136. See S. REP. No. 107-44, at 4 (2002) (describing the TVPA's implementation of
U.N. treaty obligations).
137. Engle, supra note 109, at 503-04.
138. See, e.g., Mohammad v. Hilal bin Tarraf, 114 Fed. Appx. 417, 418-19 (2d Cir.
2004) (vacating the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's torture claims and granting him
leave to amend his complaint); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 104-06
(2d Cir. 2000) (reversing the lower court's dismissal on grounds offorum non conveniens
in ATCA and TVPA torture case, noting, "Congress has expressed a policy of U.S. law
favoring the adjudication of such [ATCA] suits in U.S. courts").
139. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256(3)(b)(1), 106 Stat. 73.
140. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2000) (providing for the administrative payment of
claims for persons or property by the United States).
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arises.14 ' Based on the egregious nature of the abuse at Abu Ghraib and its
relation to interrogations seeking "information or 43a confession," 142 such
conduct plainly qualifies as torture under the TVPA.1
What remains unclear is whether foreign torture victims will be
successful in suing corporations, such as private military contractors, under
the TVPA. 144 Furthermore, beyond the challenge of navigating uncharted
legal territories, scholars have identified a number of additional obstacles
facing torture victims suing under the ATCA and TVPA. 1 45 Even in the face
were tourtered at Abu
of these challenges, many individuals alleging 1they
46
contractors.
private
against
suit
filed
have
Ghraib
IV. AUGMENTING CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY AND
COMPENSATING TORTURE VICTIMS

If anything is to be learned from the Abu Ghraib abuses, it is that
substantive steps must be taken to prevent such atrocities from
reoccurring.1 47 It is also important that torture victims receive appropriate
141. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256(2)(b)&(c), 106
Stat. 73.
142. Id.
143. See generally TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 54 (detailing the abuse at Abu Ghraib
prison and its role in detainee interrogations).
144. Engle, supra note 109, at 503-04. The TVPA references only an "individual," so it
remains to be seen how courts will apply this section to corporations. Id.
145. See id. at 504-14 (noting major obstacles facing ATCA/TVPA litigants, including
meeting jurisdiction requirements, exhausting local remedies, managing comity with other
nations, defending forum non conveniens motions, avoiding the state action doctrine,
dodging the political question doctrine, overcoming sovereign immunity, and meeting the
requisite burdens of proof). While it would seem logical to sue the U.S. government and
military under a theory of respondeatsuperior, such a claim is precluded by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS / JUDICIAL
ANSWERS (2001) 101-02 (tracing the history of sovereign immunity in the United States).
146. See, e.g., Kathy Benz, Lawsuit Targets Abu Ghraib Contractors, CNN.COM, July

(last
27, 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/27/abu.ghraib.lawsuit/index.html
visited Oct. 3, 2005) (reporting on a lawsuit that victims of Abu Ghraib torture filed
against Titan and CACI). See also, e.g., Logan, supra note 76 (noting that a plaintiffs
attorney believes the Fay and Taguba reports bolster their cases against CACI and Titan
employees).
147. Although this Comment will discuss only those changes relating to strengthening
contractor liability, it is important to note that the U.S. military has already made
numerous changes to U.S. Army policy relating to interrogation of detainees. See, e.g.,
Mark Mazzetti, Reforms in Place at Abu Ghraib, L.A. TIMES, September 4, 2004, at A3
(reporting on the numerous institutional and operational changes implemented at Abu
Ghraib pertaining to detainment and interrogation). These charges include banning the use
of dogs, sleep deprivation, hooding, and forced nakedness. Id. Soldiers, military police,
and contractors involved in interrogations now must receive an initial and regular weekly
training session. Id. See also McCarthy, supra note 48, at El. (reporting on the numerous
operational changes involving contractors at Abu Ghraib). Congress has also been active
in attempting to prohibit the use of "extreme interrogation" methods by U.S. forces and
contractors.

Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, White House Fought New Curbs on

Interrogations,Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, January 13, 2005, at A I (reporting that the U.S.
Senate approved by a margin of 96-2 intelligence reform legislation, which included
prohibition of certain "extreme interrogation" methods). However, congressional leaders
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compensation for their injuries. This section proposes various changes to
law and policy that will increase the accountability of private military
contractors and provide compensation to torture victims.
A.

Military ContractorRegulation

The prevailing criticism of private military contractors is the lack of
accountability and "checks and balances" over their conduct. 148 One
possible response to this problem is to implement
a comprehensive
149
governmental regulation of military contractors.
1.

The Benefits of RegulatingMilitary Contractors

The benefits of regulation are twofold. First, licensure would establish
industry-wide best-practices guidelines, thereby giving contractors a
meaningful operational procedure to minimize the organizational,
authoritarian, and legal challenges they currently face. 15° Second, licensure
would legitimize 15 1 an industry that many believe is operating in the shadows
of the global economy with for-hire mercenaries. 152 Licensure could also
further expand the growth of an industry 1that
employs thousands around the
53
world in an otherwise lethargic economy.
Ideally, a federal' 54 or international body would administer the
regulation and define baseline requirements of competence, accountability, 55
later deleted this prohibition from the final version of the bill after numerous Bush
Administration officials expressed opposition to the measure. Id.
148. See SINGER, supra note 24, at 220 (discussing the lack of legal and operational
accountability of contractors).
149. To remain politically and administratively viable, any proposed regulation should
entail some form of licensure, certification, or similar framework. See generally SINGER,
supra note 24, at 238-40. The likelihood of implementing other changes, such as "passing
a constitutional amendment limiting the rights of overseas military contractors" so as to
solidify their jurisdiction with military personnel, appears to be politically improbable.
Schmidt, supra note 22, at 1124.
150. See UNITED KINGDOM FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE GREEN PAPER,
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULATION 2001-02, 21 (2002),
available at http://www.sandline.com/home/Green Paper 12-2-02.pdf (providing an indepth examination of the options available to the UK government for regulating private
military contractors). See also Sandline International, Private Military Companies Independent or Regulated?, Sandline International March 28, 1998, at 2-3, available at
http://www.sandline.com/white/regulation.doc (last visited Oct. 2, 2005)(discussing the
various advantages to licensing contractors).
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 14 at 1493.
153. Id.
154. The United States already requires contractors that engage in arms exportation to
acquire a license. SINGER, supra note 24, at 238. Specifically, certain U.S. military
contractors that export arms "must seek licenses under the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations." Id. However, this licensing procedure is "idiosyncratic" to both the United
States and the contractors, and its efficacy is unclear. Id.
155. One component of this accountability must be a more substantive review process
once a contract is granted. Such a review process, ideally functioning on a regular basis,
"should include factors such as the level and efficiency of services," identify potential
problem areas, and work with relevant stakeholders to prevent or manage these problems.
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and related traits. Such regulations would ensure contractor companies and
their employees are properly screened before they are granted licensure.
Conversely, in the event that a licensed contractor corporation engages in
wrongful or illegal conduct, their license would be at risk of probation,
The most serious of these punishments,
suspension, or revocation.
to an incompetent or reckless contractor
death-knell
the
be
would
revocation,
economy. Individualized licensure of
market-based
on
a
that sustains itself
to ensure that only the most qualified
work
also
would
contractor employees
industry.
the
in
work
contractors
and competent
2.

The Obstacles Facing ContractorRegulation

Regulating military contractors does have some drawbacks. First, as
with any major bureaucratic endeavor, the cost of implementing and
56
Moreover, the
administering this regulation could be prohibitive.'
inefficiencies of the bureaucratic model could thwart the goals of
With governmental budgets strained
strengthening accountability. 157
worldwide, the peacetime operating budget of such an agency could be
Such a result would effectively negate any
slashed mercilessly.
accountability benefit realized and could render this regulatory model
ineffective.
The second major concern with a regulatory model is the effectiveness
of licensure.158 Because many contractors work overseas, often in dangerous
and remote locations, compliance with the licensure requirements or
59
standards of conduct would be difficult to monitor.'
Another potential problem with licensure is that a corporate or
individual contractor, with whom the United States refuses to do business,
may easily find a market for their services in another, more legally
hospitable, country. 160 This problem underscores the need for a consistent,
intemational model of contractor regulation.161

Id. See also G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 25 (recommending various changes to
training and operations of Army supervision of military contractors working in the
Balkans to more effectively manage costs and maintain accountability).
156. G.A.O. REPORT, supra note 25, at 21-22.
157. Id. See also Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 335 (1971) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("The bureaucracy of modem government is not only slow, lumbering, and oppressive; it

is omnipresent").
158. Id.
159. Id. One possible way to clear this obstacle in the United States is to initiate a
tripartite oversight framework comprised of the Departments of Commerce, State, and
Defense. SINGER, supra note 24, at 240. Having a multi-agency oversight framework is
critical to ensure that the experts in their respective Executive Branch Departments cover
all of the complex and "nuanced" issues. Id. As a practical matter, the now-familiar
political and fiscal concerns in creating any such framework would likely bar any change
in that direction.
160. Sandline International, supra, note 150, at 2.
161. See SINGER, supra note 24, at 239-41 for a well-reasoned analysis of the need for
an international regulatory model and a discussion of the various oversight, reporting
requirements, and sanctions necessary to ensure contractor accountability.
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Industry Self-Regulation: The Easy Way Out?

Some corporate contractors oppose the idea of governmental
regulation, instead preferring industry-wide self-regulation. 62 Under this
model, contractors suggest their respective corporate "codes of ethics" alone
are sufficient to prevent any improper behavior.' 63 In the event of illegal
behavior, the proponents of self-regulation suggest that current national and
international laws are adequate to mete out any necessary punishment.' 64
Allowing such an intricate, potentially destructive industry to self-regulate
would be a costly mistake that the international community cannot afford to
make.
B.

Expanding ContractorAccountability by Amending the MEJA

The next way to expand the accountability of private military
contractors involves amending the MEJA. 65 As enacted, the MEJA applies
' 66
only to private military contractors working on "U.S. military facilities."'
Therefore, Congress must amend the MEJA to expand jurisdiction over
contractors who operate beyond traditional U.S. military bases. Such
locations must include overseas facilities occupied by the U.S. military, such
as Abu Ghraib prison.
Moreover, Congress should amend the MEJA to include contractors
working for non-military U.S. agencies such as the Central Intelligence
Agency. 67 Other scholars have suggested Congress incorporate into federal
law "crimes against humanity" and other universally recognized prohibitions
to ensure that the Unites States can comply with the requirements of
international law. 168 Ultimately, these changes to federal law would provide
additional options and guidance to the Department of Justice in prosecuting
contractors.
While changing the laws and regulatory framework of contractors is
important, a larger concern is the U.S. military's need to attract and retain the
human resources necessary to complete our nation's most sensitive and
mission-critical intelligence work. 69 Such work must not be entrusted to
17
private contractors unless absolutely necessary. 0
162. SANDLINE INTERNATIONAL, supra note 150, at 2.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. For a discussion of the MEJA, see generally Perlak, supra note 80.
166. SINGER, supra note 24, at 240.
167. Id.
168. Jordan Paust, Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib: Will Prosecution and
Cashieringof a Few Soldiers Comply With InternationalLaw?, JURIST, May 10, 2004,
availableat http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/paust1.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2005).
169. SINGER, supra note 24, at 236.
170. Id. The U.S. military continues to see its reliance on contractors as a necessity.
Both CACI and Titan Corp. have received subsequent multi-million dollar contracts to
perform additional services for the military around the world. See William Welsh, Navy
Re-Ups CACIs Support and Training Contract,WASH. POST, December 27, 2004, at E4
(reporting that the U.S. Navy renewed a S16 million CACI contract to provide "logistics
support and training services"); Bruce V. Bigelow, Revenue at Titan Up 12%, But Profit
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C.

Compensating the Torture Victims

Beyond changing the regulatory framework of private military
contractors, the United States and the international community should also
7
establish a more substantive vehicle' ' to assist victims of war crimes and
non-military victims of personal or property damages. The U.S. government
is currently working towards establishing a unilateral, state-sponsored
compensation process for the victims of the Abu Ghraib abuses, but the
methodologies used to process and award the victims' claims are not yet
known.172 Nevertheless, to ensure an independent and fair allocation of
compensation, the United States should consider using an external
compensation vehicle.
An example of such a vehicle is the United Nations Compensation
Commission (UNCC). 173 The U.N. Security Council established the UNCC
after the Gulf War in 1991 in order to process claims for damages and award
74
Ten years after the
payments stemming from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.'
it awarded over $32.2 billion to the most pressing of
UNCC was created,
175
these injuries.
Reestablishing the UNCC during the current Iraq war would provide an
independent arbiter and administrator to award damages quickly and fairly to
76
Also, because the
the victims of Abu Ghraib and other wartime injuries.
law, 177
international
in
precedent
successful
and
initial UNCC was a novel
the U.N. and its member states should not face any major legal obstacles in

Flat, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 28, 2004, at Cl (reporting that the U.S. Army
extended Titan's $657 million translation contract and that Titan has numerous additional
pending contracts); Edmond Lococo, U.S. Army to Extend Titan Translation Contract,
BLOOMBERG NEWS,

June 28, 2005 (reporting that Titan's translation contract will be

extended past its deadline and that translation work accounts for $247 million of its total
sales).

171. See cases cited supra note 8 (discussing the current compensation scheme available
to Iraqi civilians who suffer personal or property injuries from U.S. forces).

172. See U.S. Department of Defense, Testimony as Prepared by Secretary of Defense
Committees,(2004)
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Before The Senate and House Armed Services
4 5 7
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp200 O O -secdefl O42.html (last
visited Oct. 24, 2005)("I am seeking a way to provide appropriate compensation to those
detainees who suffered grievous and brutal abuse and cruelty... It is the right thing to do.
I'm told we have the ability to do so. And so we will - one way or another."
173. For an insightful, historical treatment of the UNCC, see Rosemary E. Libera,

Divide, Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensationfor Wartime Damages, 24 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 291, 295-96 (2001).

174. Id. at 296. Funding for the UNCC was derived primarily from sale proceeds of
Iraq's oil. Id. Since its inception in 1991, the UNCC has received approximately 2.6
million claims seeking compensation for personal, corporate, government, and property
injuries suffered during the Gulf War. The damages complained of range from hundreds
of dollars to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Id. at 299-300. The claims were divided
into six categories and were acted on "in order of humanitarian need." Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 296 (describing the UNCC's structural makeup and goals).
177. See Gregory Townsend, The Iraq Claims Process: A Progress Report on the
United Nations Compensation Commission & U.S. Remedies, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REv. 973, 1027 (1995) (describing the UNCC's accomplishments).
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reconvening the UNCC in response to damages stemming from Operation
Iraqi Freedom. 78 Indeed, current U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has
1 79
already voiced his support for a permanent reparations commission.
The major impediments to reestablishing the UNCC are political and
economic. First, due to the complex diplomatic and geo-political climate
between the United States, the U.N., and other U.N. member nations, it
would be difficult to recreate such a massive program. 80 Second, a major
source of contention would be the method of funding a modem UNCC.
While it may be possible to rely again on Iraqi oil revenues for funding, the
ever-evolving complexities and vagaries of the nascent Iraqi government
must be considered in designing any program of this magnitude.

V.

CONCLUSION

Private military contractors have long served as an integral part of
the U.S. military and its operating strategy. Currently, the use of contractors
continues to expand what has long been the exclusive domain of the federal
18
government and its employees. 1
Investigations into the torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib have found
that both U.S. active duty military personnel and private military contractors
were responsible. Although the U.S. government and military likely will not
be civilly liable for their conduct, the military has already punished several
soldiers with criminal sanctions. However, it is critical that the United States
hold the private military contractors criminally accountable for the atrocities
at Abu Ghraib. It is equally important that any torture victims obtain the
right to determine whether compensation for their injuries is appropriate.
To reach these ends, Congress should amend various sections of federal
law and the U.N. should consider whether implementation of a reparations
program is appropriate.
While the U.S. military has already made
178. Libera, supra note 173, at 300-01.
179. See ThalifDeen, U.N. ChiefBacks CompensationFor Civilian War Victims, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, August 23, 2004 (noting Kofi Annan's support of establishing a
permanent U.N. reparations body, but quoting Professor Francis Boyle in saying, "I doubt
very seriously the U.S. government would approve it or fund it, for obvious reasons"). See
also U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, THE RULE OF LAW AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
IN CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-

GENERAL 18 (2004) available at http://www.undp.org/bcpr/jssr/4_resources/documents/
UN_2004_Rule%20of%20Law.pdf (discussing the need for both tribunals and truth
commissions to help vet through complaints and ensure an efficient remedial service to
victims in need) (last visited Oct. 20, 2005).
180. See Deen, supra note 179 (quoting Professor Francis Boyle's expression of doubt
as to U.S. support for another version of the UNCC). Professor Boyle's doubts stem
partially from the Bush Administration's refusal to ratify the International Criminal Court.

Id.
181. See, e.g., Wilson P. Dizard III, DHS Eyes OutsourcingIntelligence Work, WASH.
TECH., Oct. 6, 2004, available at http://www.wtonline.com/news/l_l/daily-news/246661.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005)(reporting that the Department of Homeland Security is
soliciting bids for eighty-four private contractors to serve as "intelligence research and
operations specialists" in the DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement division).
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substantive changes to its interrogation policies and procedures, more must
be done. By implementing these changes, the United States can further
strengthen accountability over military contractors and work to prevent
another Abu Ghraib scandal from occurring.

